Planning for Failure in Afghanistan

Col. Sam Gardiner, USAF (ret.) and Erik Leaver
Foreign Policy In Focus

It's official. President Barack Obama now fully owns the war in Afghanistan. Standing alongside his military advisors and in front of the Washington press corps, he outlined a plan with "a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan." While the goal and the five objectives to meet this goal are clear, they're also unattainable and will likely result in the U.S. (and NATO) being trapped in the region for decades to come.

Searching for a solution in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in 2007, the National Security Council Principals Committee reexamined and reset U.S. objectives for Afghanistan. These essentially boiled down to establishing a democracy and a working capitalist state in which women were well- treated. With the military set to take the lead or a main support role to achieve these objectives, there was no way they could be achieved and, more importantly, there was no indication of when such a mission would be finished.

No less than eight strategy reviews have been conducted in the last several months. They've all concluded that the primary objective should be more limited, essentially calling for action to stop Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. The problem with even this more limited objective is that there is no way in which the United States or NATO could achieve it without staying forever. As long as the United States and NATO forces are there in great numbers, it won't be a safe haven. But when forces leave, the opportunity would exist for it to roll back.

Obama's plan, along with all eight strategy reviews, have missed the seven-plus years of our experience there. Red flags should have been raised as Obama outlined his five core objectives:

Security

Since the invasion began the Afghans haven't shown any propensity to take care of their own security. Even those military forces who have been trained by the United States and NATO freely allow Taliban to pass through their territory if they pay. The Afghan tradition of corruption is overwhelming. With the drug trade flourishing, there is little hope that these military forces could ever be paid enough to bring a stop to the temptations of corruption.

In a late March BBC interview, Afghan finance minister (and presidential candidate) Anwarulhaq Ahadisaid said the United States allowed corruption to come into the Afghanistan government. As with President Hamid Karzai, we see the pattern of denying any responsibility for corruption.

As Obama noted, 2008 was the deadliest for U.S. soldiers on the ground. It was also the deadliest for Afghans. In 2008, civilian casualties climbed 40%, topping 2,100. Public awareness of those casualties brought heightened anger at and opposition to the U.S. military presence, even beyond opposition to the specific attacks. Challenges grew around U.S. supply lines, and war objectives were increasingly recognized as unclear. As in Iraq, the use of roadside bombs and suicide bombers significantly increased. The increase in casualties corresponds directly with the increase in U.S. and NATO troop strength. More importantly, the "surge" of 17,000 troops further undermines the....

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